

It does not help that the British defense community, as reflected by numerous military and Ministry of Defense publications, is strongly influenced by the United States military. Ukraine also has brought additional focus on high-intensity warfare, which requires a rather different kind of army from one intended to be multi-purpose or tailored for security assistance or low-intensity operations. Where are its priorities? Ukraine has muddied waters further by bringing to light new developments in the art of war, especially as it relates to technology, and the tradeoffs implied by betting on quality over quantity. Likewise, the Ministry of Defense for at least a decade has been at a loss to settle on a clear vision of what Her Majesty’s military is for, and therefore what capabilities it must have. Indeed, across the board it can be said that the United Kingdom’s armed forces, right or wrong, have chosen pricey high technology over other considerations, namely mass. While the Royal Navy and Air Force perhaps have done better with respect to modernization, their choices have been contentious because of their extraordinary cost and uncertainty over whether they were betting on the right equipment. It is too small and the Army suffers from botched modernization programs and ever-shifting requirements. All agree that the British Army is in a mess. Since well before Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the British defense community has been struggling to reach a consensus about the direction the United Kingdom’s army needs to take.
